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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000280

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DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND EAP
NSC FOR PITTMAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [SU](#) [CH](#)
SUBJECT: S/E WILLIAMSON CLARIFIES FACTS OF UNAMID
DEPLOYMENT WITH CHINESE ENVOY

REF: DLO KHARTOUM IIR 6890014608

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary

¶1. (C) In a February 25 meeting with Chinese Envoy Liu Guijin in Khartoum, S/E Williamson reported that he had asked Khartoum to take practical steps to facilitate the deployment of UNAMID and "get more boots on the ground" in Darfur. He urged China to convey to Khartoum the importance of expediting UNAMID deployment. Guijin argued that Khartoum had made a "certain degree of compromises," agreeing to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for UNAMID in February, "more or less" resolving land allocation for UNAMID sites, and agreeing to night flights for the peacekeeping force after UNAMID had improved airport facilities. He cautioned that a peacekeeping force is not sustainable without a political settlement and urged Western countries to use their influence on Darfur's rebel groups to press them toward negotiations. S/E Williamson asserted that Guijin's reports on the status of UNAMID were "inconsistent with the facts as we know them," and said that the patience of President Bush, Congress, and the American people is "up." In a subsequent meeting with Embassy's Defense Attache, the Chinese DATT offered a more pessimistic view of UNAMID deployment than Guijin. End summary.

More Boots on the Ground

¶2. (C) Meeting with Chinese Special Envoy for Darfur Liu Guijin in Khartoum on February 25, Special Envoy Williamson explained that his message to the Sudanese Government was that it must take practical steps to deploy the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to alleviate humanitarian suffering. Acknowledging that the UN has--at times--not been as respectful of Sudan's sovereignty as it could, he emphasized that the Sudanese Government should respond to the international community's interest in constructive dialogue to "get more boots on the ground" in Darfur.

¶3. (C) S/E Williamson reported that he had asked Khartoum to decrease the processing time for the import of UNAMID equipment, to set target dates for deployment of 3,600 African peacekeepers within the next three months, and to consider Thai and Nepali troop contributions. The USG and Sudan shared an interest in seeing the dissolution of IDP camps and the return of IDPs to their homes, according to Williamson, and UNAMID would facilitate this development by

improving security. He underscored, however, that forced returns is contrary to international humanitarian law. The USG and China shared a "growing commonality of interests," and though policy differences existed, the two countries can work together on Sudan, he said. S/E Williamson asked that "other important voices" convey to Khartoum the importance of expediting UNAMID's deployment.

"A Certain Degree of Compromises"

15. (C) Guijin agreed that China and Sudan shared the "same objectives in Darfur" and said that there are two fundamental solutions to the conflict: UNAMID deployment and the peace process. He argued that Khartoum had made a "certain degree of compromises," agreeing to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for UNAMID in February, "more or less" resolving land allocation for UNAMID sites, and agreeing to night flights for the peacekeeping force after UNAMID had improved airport facilities. During his current trip, Guijin said asked Sudanese officials to accept Thai and Nepali troops and claimed that Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada later told him that "there is no problem with the Nepal."

16. (C) The priority, according to Guijin, is to help African troop contributors and the UN meet their commitments. He reminded S/E Williamson that UNAMID still lacks pledges for a transportation battalion and 24 helicopters. While the remaining 179 members of the Chinese engineering unit are ready to deploy and the equipment is in place in Darfur, "they are waiting for the green light from the UN."

17. (C) In contrast to UNAMID deployment, the peace process is

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moving more slowly, said Guijin. China has no direct links with Darfur's rebel groups, and he requested that Western countries, particularly those in Europe, use their influence to press them toward negotiations. "Without a political settlement, the peacekeeping operation is not sustainable." He noted that while China would never ask France to expel Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al Nur from Paris, it had a "moral obligation" to do so.

Non-Interference

18. (C) Guijin said that China will pursue a diplomatic approach with Sudan "that is familiar to us" and consistent with China's basic foreign policy principle of non-interference. Beijing's goal continued to be a "practical, workable, long-term, fundamental solution" to the Darfur conflict. However, while you must criticize a boy when he has done something "bad," Guijin explained, it is not necessary to do so in public. "Sanctions, coercions don't work, even if you try to overthrow the Government," he said. Guijin recounted that State Minister of Foreign Affairs Samani Al Wasila had traveled to Washington in September 2007 with a message to improve relations and "nothing happened."

Inconsistent "Facts"

19. (C) Parrying Guijin's arguments, S/E Williamson asserted that Guijin's reports on the status of UNAMID were "inconsistent with the facts as we know them." Sudan has raised more impediments to the deployment of the peacekeeping force that he had seen in 30 years of diplomatic work, said Williamson, and the SOFA agreed to by Khartoum was the weakest in UN history. A meaningful peace process is difficult in the current security environment, said Williamson. "Realistically, it will be a peace process for process' sake until the situation changes," noting that the

patience of President Bush, Congress, and the American people is "up."

Follow-Up Meeting with Chinese DATT

¶10. (C) Following the meeting between S/E Williamson and Guijin, Embassy's Defense Attache (DATT) met with Senior Colonel Dong Jian Dong, the Chinese DATT, to discuss UNAMID operations in more detail (reftel). Dong stated that progress on the Nyala UNAMID Super-Camp was moving slowly. The initial Chinese engineers arrived in early December but did not start residing at the Super-Camp until mid-February due to the lack of UNAMID security forces. The initial Chinese engineering equipment that arrived at Port Sudan was scheduled to take nine days to be transported to Nyala, which had stretched to six weeks. Initial equipment flown into Khartoum International Airport was scheduled to take seven days to transport to Nyala but stretched to three weeks, he said. Dong attributed these delays to Sudanese customs inspection and UNAMID inefficiency in coordinating transportation. The remaining Chinese heavy engineer equipment left China by ship in mid-February and should arrive at Port Sudan around March 1. The Chinese DATT predicted as long a delay in transporting this equipment to Nyala as with the initial shipment. He also reported that Chinese engineers do not believe there are sufficient water sources at the Super-Camp site to sustain the UNAMID forces projected for the location.

¶11. (U) S/E Williamson did not have a chance to clear this message.
FERNANDEZ